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CHARTER INSIGHTS FOR AMERICAN EQUALITY
JURISPRUDENCE

Stephen F. Ross*
Although both the Canadian Charter and the UnitedStates
Constitutionsprotectpersons from denial of equalprotection of
the law, the interpretation of the broad language of the two
equality guarantees has been quite different. The Supreme
Court of Canada has adopted an approach of substantive
equality, concluding that section 15 is designed to prevent the
loss ofhuman dignity that accompaniesdiscriminationbased on
disadvantage and stereotype. At least with regard to race, a
majority of the justices on the United States Supreme Court
adhere to ajurisprudenceofformal equality, concluding that the
Fifth and FourteenthAmendments prohibit-absentcompelling
justifications-any formal distinction, regardless of whether
differential treatment resultsfrom racism or a sincere desire to
ameliorate prior conditions of racial inequality. This paper
suggests that Canadian equality jurisprudence has developed
over the last twenty years into a workable constitutional
doctrine that deserves attention and, indeed, emulation in the
United States. Although from a purely descriptive perspective
there are a variety of historical and value-based differences
between American and Canadiansociety that can explain the
different constitutionaldoctrinesdeveloped in each country, the
paper considers and rejects the hypothesis that these differences
are so significant as to render Canadian insights irrelevant to
the American context. The paper concludes that the Canadian
approach is more faithfil to a jurisprudence sensitive to the
limitedjudicialactivism calledfor by the landmark American
decision in CaroleneProducts.
I. INTRODUCTION
It would be preferable to add to the observations of my colleagues regarding
constitutional developments in South Africa and New Zealand with parallel
reports of the profound effect that the CanadianCharterofRights and Freedoms
1 has had on American constitutional law. As in so many other areas of life,
however, Americans are much less interested in the law of other countries than
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we should be. 2 As is doubtless true elsewhere as well, this ethnocentrism,
especially with regard to our northern neighbour, is a major mistake. Canadian
constitutional law, and in particular the Charter,provide extremely valuable
insights that may be employed to develop constitutional doctrines in the
United States. This paper discusses the significant differences in equality
jurisprudence between the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of section
15 of the Charterand the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the
3
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Although both the Canadian Charterand the United States Constitution
protect persons from denial of equal protection of the law, the interpretation of
the broad language of the two equality guarantees has been quite different. The
Supreme Court of Canada has adopted an approach of substantive equality,
concluding that section 15 is designed to prevent the loss of human dignity that
accompanies discrimination based on disadvantage and stereotype. At least with
regard to race, a majority of the justices on the United States Supreme Court
adhere to a jurisprudence of formal equality, concluding that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit-absent compelling justifications-any formal
distinction, regardless of whether differential treatment results from racism or a
sincere desire to ameliorate prior conditions of racial inequality.
This paper suggests that Canadian equality jurisprudence has developed
over the last twenty years into a workable constitutional doctrine that deserves
attention and, indeed, emulation in the United States. Part I traces the
evolution of the doctrine of formal equality in American jurisprudence and of
substantive equality by the Supreme Court of Canada. Part II considers several
objections to a jurisprudence that tolerates affirmative action programs and
explores the Canadian response to these concerns. Although from a purely
descriptive perspective there are a variety of historical and value-based
differences between American and Canadian society that can explain the
different constitutional doctrines developed in each country, Part III analyses
these differences and suggests that they are not so significant as to render
Canadian insights irrelevant to the American context. Part IV concludes that
the Canadian approach is more faithful to a jurisprudence sensitive to the
limited judicial activism called for by the landmark American decision in
4
CaroleneProducts.
II. THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO EQUALITY
Perhaps the best known statement of constitutional law ever written by the
United States Supreme Court is the ringing declaration from Brown v. Board of

Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan. that "separate educational facilities

2

3

4

See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n. 11(1997) ("we think such comparative
analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite
relevant to the task of writing one").
This represents an overview of a larger project planned to review a variety of differences
between American and Canadian constitutional approaches, including other substantive,
procedural, and separation of powers issues.
United States v. CaroleneProducts Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) [CaroleneProducts].
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are inherently unequal." 5 When my students at the University of Illinois are
asked, virtually all agree with this statement. Yet when I turn to my
Comparative Constitutional Law students at the University of British
Columbia, taking the course via teleconferencing, most demur, citing the
6
Charter guarantee of separate educational facilities for linguistic minorities.
Canadian students easily distinguish Brown, observing the fundamental
difference between a white majority telling racial minorities that their children
cannot attend the same schools as their white neighbours and the situation
where Anglophone Montrealers or Francophone Edmontonians demand the
right to send their children to separate schools they control to be taught in their
native language. In short, separate educational facilities are not inherently
unequal.
Of course, the United States Supreme Court understood this distinction.
Prior to its ringing, if misleading, statement, the Court carefully catalogued the
way that apartheid in the American south had rendered equal segregated
schools an impossibility-in that specific context. After emphasizing the
importance of education in life's successes, the Court observed that to separate
minority children "from others of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
7
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
The Court cited with approval the finding of the trial judge that statesanctioned segregation "is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
negro group." 8 In contrast, especially where minority parents are given control
of a separate but equal education that is optional for their children, 9 inferences
of inferiority can simply not be drawn.
Significantly, although the unanimous decision in Brown overruled the
"separate but equal" doctrine originally enunciated by the Court in Plessy v.
Ferguson,' ° the opinion did not expressly endorse (nor has a majority opinion
ever endorsed) Justice John Marshall Harlan's famous statement in his Plessy
dissent that the "Constitution is color-blind."' "I The Court did, however,
suggest that Plessy had not been faithful to post-Civil War decisions interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "as proscribing all

5
6
7
8
9
10
II

347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) [Brown].
Supra note 2,Section 23.
Brown, supra note 6 at 494.
Ibid. at 494.
Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, 68 D.L.R. (4th) 69.
163 U.S. 537 (1896), rev'd Brown, supra note 6 [Plessy].
Ibid. at 559. Indeed, this famous adage has been cited only five times in minority opinions by
Supreme Court justices. Its first invocation was in a concurring opinion by Justice Douglas in
Garner v. Louisiana, 386 U.S. 157, 185 (1961), to support his view (not shared by the Court)
that public restaurants could not constitutionally discriminate on the basis of race. See also
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 288 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (joining Court's
remand of trespass convictions for protesting discrimination by restaurants because of change
in state law, opinion found private discrimination unconstitutional). These concurring
opinions have not received judicial acceptance, but were implemented by statute when
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964,Title II of which prohibits racial discrimination
in public accommodations. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. In the principal dissent to
Regents of the Univ. of Calif v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 356 (1978) [Bakke], four justices wrote
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state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. '12 The ambiguity about
whether the United States Constitution demands formal equality, or instead
requires that an empowered majority not discriminate against a disadvantaged
minority, indeed comes from the very opinions upon which Brown relied. In a
footnote,' 3 the Court in Brown quoted from Strauder v. West Virginia
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment:
It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, or deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this but
declaring that the law in the States shall be the samefor the black as

for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand
equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race,
fir whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
discriminationshall be made against them by law because of their
color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but
they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or
right, most valuable to the colored race, - the right to exemption
from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored, exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil
society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which
others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing
14
them to the condition of a subject race.

As is evident in this same paragraph, cited in full in Brown, the Court
announced a doctrine of formal equality and at the same time read the
Amendment to protect racial minorities against "unfriendly legislation against
them" that "implied inferiority" or were "steps toward reducing them to the
condition of a subject race." But the modern tension between colour-blindness
and affirmative action was not even contemplated during legislative
deliberations regarding the Civil Rights Act of 1964, much less at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As Justice Louis Powell explained:

that Justice Harlan's "short-hand phrase" has "never been adopted by this Court as the proper
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." Harlan, J.'s language was first invoked to support
an interpretation that prevented ameliorative legislation in the dissenting opinion in Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (1980) [Fullilove], (Stewart, J., dissenting) (majority had
upheld a statute requiring 10% of federal contracts to be set-aside for minority contractors),
overruled, Doe v. Univ. of Illinois 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998). See also Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FC.C, 497 U.S. 547, 627 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (majority upheld FCC
policy of favouring broadcast license applications from minority owned companies) cert denied,

497 U.S. 1050 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 421 (1989) (Scalia,
J. dissenting) [Croson] (objecting to suggestion in plurality opinion of O'Connor, J. that racial
discrimination may in some circumstances be constitutional to ameliorate prior
discrimination).
12 Brown, supra note 6 at 490 (emphasis added).
13 Ibid.at 490 n.5.
14 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880) (emphasis added) [Straude.
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The problem confronting Congress was discrimination against
Negro citizens at the hands of recipients of federal moneys ...
There simply was no reason for Congress to consider the validity of
hypothetical preferences that might be accorded minority citizens;
the legislators were dealing with the real and pressing problem of
15
how to guarantee those citizens equal treatment.
Both the Strauderfootnote and the paradoxical marshalling of contextual
evidence about the effect of segregation on African-Americans while
proclaiming the "inherent" inequality of segregation contain the seeds of the
division that now plays out in a series of five-to-four decisions by the United
States Supreme Court on issues of racial discrimination. This division was first
exposed in Bakke,16 where a splintered Court struck down a plan reserving a
fixed number of spaces at the UC Davis medical school for racial minorities.
Four justices did not reach the constitutional issue, finding instead that the plan
violated a statutory prohibition on race discrimination by institutions receiving
federal funds. 7 Justice Louis Powell cast the decisive vote against the plan,
concluding that the statute only prohibited discrimination that was
unconstitutional 18 and then holding that the Fourteenth Amendment,
although conceived by many of its drafters as "bridging the vast distance
between the members of the Negro race and the white 'majority,"' was framed
without reference to colour and therefore applied to prohibit programs that
adversely affected white persons on the grounds of race.1 9 Four other justices,
agreeing with Powell, J. on the statutory issue, dissented from his conclusion
that affirmative action programs were unconstitutional. The dissent found that
these programs did not seem to violate the "cardinal principle" from the Court's
prior equality jurisprudence: "racial classifications that stigmatize-because they
are drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to another or because
they put the weight of government behind racial hatred and separatism-are
invalid without more." 20 However, "because of the significant risk that racial
classifications established for ostensibly benign purposes can be misused,
causing effects not unlike those created by invidious classifications," courts
should review racially-differential treatment to ensure that it serves "an
important and articulated purpose" and should invalidate action "that
stigmatizes any group or that singles out those least well represented in the
21
political process to bear the brunt of a benign program."
The current five-justice majority has embraced Justice Powell's basic
approach in Bakke, interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to require a state
to demonstrate that ameliorative legislation drawing race-based lines is

supra note 12 at 285 (Powell, J.)(emphasis added).
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.at412 (Stevens,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
18 Ibid.at 287.
19 Ibid. at 293 (citing The Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71, 21 LEd. 394 (1873)).
20 Ibid.at 357-58 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring inthe judgment and
15 Bakke,

dissenting in part).
21 Ibid. at361.
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necessary to achieve a compelling state interest 22 and expressly rejecting the
view that constitutional analysis depends "on the race of those burdened or
benefited by a particular classification. ' 23 In contrast, the current dissenting
justices adhere to the view expressed by the Bakke dissenters that the Fourteenth
Amendment reflects a "duty to govern impartially" that is not violated when the
24
majority acts to benefit under-represented groups that lack power.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Bakke also marks the
departure point for Canadian equality jurisprudence. The drafters of the
Charter specifically included section 15(2), stating that the general equality
principle of section 15(1) "does not preclude" governmental action "that has as
its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups" in order to avoid litigation similar to Bakke.25 Beginning with Andrews
v.Law Society British Columbia,26 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
purpose of the equality guarantee in section 15(1) is to remedy historical
disadvantage, and has recognized that identical treatment can perpetuate
disadvantage and that equality may sometimes require different treatment. As
the unanimous Court recently stated in Lovelace v. Ontario27 -after
determining that the challenged governmental action the question imposes
differential treatment based on grounds proscribed by section 1 5 28-- courts ask
'2 9
whether the challenged action "is substantively discriminatory.
The Canadian embrace of substantive equality did not inevitably follow
from the framers' determination to reject Bakke. Indeed, most American readers
of the Charterstext assume that section 15(2) is an exception to the equality
principles set forth in section 15(1), which otherwise would seem to be
30
equivalent to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Without this "exemption," the broad equality rights in section 15(1) could be

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

29
30

See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993).
Ibid. at 623 (quoting Croson, supra note 12 at 472 (plurality opinion).
Ibid. at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Ardoch Algonquin First Nation v.Ontario (1997), 33 OR. (3d) 735, 148 D.L.R. (4th) 126,
142-43 (C.A.), aff'dsub nom. Lovelacev. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, 188 D.L.R. (4th) 193.
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [Andrews cited to S.C.R.].
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, 188 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Lovelacecited to S.C.R.].
Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the text of section 15 provides that individuals are
protected from discrimination, "and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." The
Supreme Court has interpreted this to limit the scope of Section 15 to discrimination based on
these enumerated grounds or grounds "analogous" to the enumerated ones. See, e.g., R. v.
Turpin, [19891 1 S.C.R. 1296, 1332, 48 C.C.C. (3d) 8. See EW Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of
Canada(Toronto: Carswell, loose-leafed.), at §52.7(e) (alienage, sexual orientation, and status
as a non-reserve Indian are analogous grounds; persons injured by employment-related
accidents, claimants against the Crown, place of residence are not).
Lovelace, supra note 28 at 984.
To be sure, the Canadian Charter is more specific, declaring that every individual is equal
before the law, under the law, has the right to equal protection, and the right to equal benefit
of the law, while the American Constitution simply prohibits states from depriving persons of
equal protection of the law. But this additional language was not designed to make Canadian
equality rights more expansive than American equality rights, but rather to respond to specific
and oft-criticized narrow interpretations of the equality provisions in the pre-Charterstatutory
Bill ofRights. Hogg, supra note 29 at §52.6(a).
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read in accord with the majority American view.
The Supreme Court of Canada, however, has explicitly rejected such a
reading, which would inappropriately view affirmative action programs as
constituting prima facie violations of the basic equality principles of Section
15(1)-a view inconsistent with substantive equality analysis. 31 Rather, the
section is seen as "comfirmatory and supplementary to Section 15(1)," not as
"language of defence or exemption." 32 Both sections reflect a shared "central
purpose"-"to protect against the violation of essential human dignity" that
33
comes from substantive discrimination.
To determine whether an act is substantively discriminatory, the Court takes
a look at four "contextual factors"-"(i) pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping,
prejudice, or vulnerability, (ii) the correspondence, or lack thereof, between the
ground(s) on which the claim is based and the actual need, capacity, or
circumstances of the claimant or others, (iii) the ameliorative purpose or effects
of the impugned law, program or activity upon a more disadvantaged person or
group in society, and (iv) the nature and scope of the interest affected by the
impugned government activity."3 4 Although the Court has rejected a "strict
dichotomy" between advantaged and disadvantaged groups, the Court has
identified
the social reality that a member of a group which historically has
been more disadvantaged in Canadian society is less likely to have
difficulty in demonstrating discrimination. Since Andrews, it has
been recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court that an
important, though not exclusive, purpose of s 15(1) is the
protection of individuals and groups who are vulnerable,
disadvantaged, or members of "discrete and insular minorities."
The effects of a law as they relate-to this purpose should always be
35
a central consideration in the contextual Section 15(1) analysis.

31 Lovelace, supranote 28 at 1007 (citing Colleen Sheppard's 1993 report for the Ontario Law
Reform Commission, "Litigating the Relationship Between Equity and Equality").
32 Ibid. at 1010. A leading constitutional expert "noted that the drafters of section 15 added
section 15(2) out of 'excessive caution,' intending to bolster the substantive equality approach
in section 15(1), since, at the time the Charter was being drafted, there was a worry that
affirmative action programs would be over-turned on the basis of reverse discrimination." Ibid.
(citing Walter S. Tarnopolsky, "The Equality Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1983), 61 Can. Bar Rev. 242). This line of reasoning was previewed by the opinion
by Justice Ritchie, for himself and three colleagues, in Athabasca Tribal Council v. Amoco
Canada Petroleum Co., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 699, 711, 124 D.L.R. (3d) 1 [Athabasca] ("Ican see
no reason why the measures proposed by the 'affirmative action' programs for the betterment
of the lot of the native peoples in the area in question should be construed as 'discriminating
against' other inhabitants" in violation of the Alberta employment discrimination statute,
which did not contain any exempting provision such as section 15(2) of the Charter. The
majority of the Court did not reach that question.
33 Lovelace, supra note 28 at 984.
34 Ibid. at 990-91.
35 Ibid. at 986-87 (quoting Law v. Canada (Ministerof Employment and Immigration), [1999) 1
S.C.R.497, 537, 170 D.L.R. (4th) 1 ) [Law cited to S.C.R.]. The reference in the quote is to
Andrews. supra note 27.
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Thus, in a marked departure from the current American majority view,
the Court has explicitly held that:
where a relatively more advantaged claimant was excluded from a
targeted ameliorative program ... the exclusion will likely not
violate the human dignity of more advantaged individuals where
the exclusion of these more advantaged individuals largely
corresponds to the greater need or the different circumstances
experienced by the disadvantaged group being targeted by the
36
legislation.

III. CANADIAN INSIGHTS ABOUT COMMON VALUES
This paper is obviously not intended to provide comprehensive treatment of
the constitutionality of affirmative action in either country. However, the
Canadian experience does shed light on at least two arguments often made by
American justices hostile to the use of race-conscious measures to ameliorate
social problems. One is that affirmative action programs do not really eliminate
societal disadvantage and racism, but rather reinforce stereotypes about racial
minorities, engender feelings of superiority by the majority, and create
resentments that frustrate racial progress. Another argument is that a
jurisprudence where the legality of classifications turns on concepts like societal
disadvantage, stigma, or affronts to human dignity is standardless and not
administrable. These arguments have salience on both sides of the border. The
Canadian experience provides modest insights for interested Americans about
how a similar legal culture views these important issues, raising serious
questions about whether these arguments justify the use of judicial power to
invalidate ameliorative statutes.
Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to promote formal equality is
sufficient but not necessary to create doctrine hostile to race-conscious
affirmative action programs. Many Americans hostile to affirmative action
might well reach the same conclusion even if American equality jurisprudence,
like Canadian law, focused on a contextual assessment of substantive
discrimination. Law, after all, condemns differential treatment based on
stereotype. 37 In Bakke, Justice Powell observed that preferential programs "may
only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to
achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no
relationship to individual worth." 38 In Adarand,Justice Thomas, citing the
principle from the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created
equal," argued that "the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of [the
challenged affirmative action] program is at war with the principle of equality
that underlies and infuses our Constitution." He added:

36 Law, ibid.at 539.
37 Supra note 36 at 535.
38 Supra note 12 at 298,

VoL 21

Charter Insights

235

But there can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its

unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as
any other form of discrimination. Socalled "benign" discrimination

teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable
handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without their
patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender
attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among
those who believe that they have been wronged by the government's
use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of
inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to
39
adopt an attitude that they are "entitled" to preferences.
To be sure, these arguments are highly contested even within American
jurisprudence. Justices in the American minority are keenly aware of the
potential for discriminatory legislation to be designed in a manner appearing to
be helpful to the disfavoured class, but have not found the racial classifications
challenged in the cases discussed above to be wanting on that score. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for example, pioneered the argument that the exclusion
of women from juries and other acts appearing to "help" women were
constitutionally flawed because they were based on stereotype. 40 She has had no
difficulty, however, concluding that deliberate drawing of majority-black
districts or congressional schemes to aid minority entrepreneurs do not raise
4
these constitutional difficulties. '
The significance for Americans of Canadian jurisprudence here is a version
of Sherlock Holmes' famous insight about the dog that didn't bark. 42 None of
the major equality decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada even discusses
this concern seriously. In contrast, when the Canadian justices considered the
constitutionality of criminalizing hate speech, now-Chief Justice McLachlin
dissented expressly on the basis that providing special attention to crimes
directed at racial or religious groups would create resentment and martyr status
for bigots that would frustrate Canada's goals of ending discrimination and
bigotry.43 Inquiring American minds might find the Canadian sanguinity to
simply be misguided, or might identify something in comparative sociology
that suggests that ameliorative programs in the United States are more likely to
exacerbate racial tensions than similar programs north of the border. Still, the
Canadian perspective should at least call for further introspection about why

39 Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
[Adaranal.
40 See K. M. Sullivan, "Constitutionalizing Women's Equality" (2002) 90 Calif. L. Rev. 735, 752.
41 See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (joining majority opinion upholding raceconscious redistricting plan); Adarand, supra note 40 at 271 (dissenting op.) ("in view of the
attention the political branches are currently giving the matter of affirmative action, I see no
compelling cause for the intervention the Court has made in this case" and stating agreement
with Stevens, J., that courts should defer to congressional authority to overcome historic racial
subjugation).
42 See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991), cert. denied 975 F.2d 1092
2
(199 )(citing A. Doyle, "Silver Blaze," in The Complete Sherlock Holmes 335 (1927)).
43 R v. Keegstra, (19901 3 S.C.R. 697, 836-37, 852-53, 61 C.C.C. (3d) l[Keegstral.
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American justices currently in the majority are so confident of their conclusion
that they are prepared to displace the views of elected officials on the subject.
Another important concern expressed by the American majority about
ameliorative programs is that a substantive equality standard lacks judicially
manageable standards. In Bakke, Justice Powell complained that his brethren
who favoured less active scrutiny of affirmative action than hostile racial
classifications "offer no principle for deciding whether preferential
classifications reflect a benign remedial purpose or a malevolent stigmatic
classification. " 44 In his view, jurisprudence of substantive equality would
require courts to:
evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered
by various minority groups. Those whose societal injury is thought
to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled
to preferential classifications at the expense of individuals
belonging to other groups. Those classifications would be free from
exacting judicial scrutiny. As these preferences began to have their
desired effect, and the consequences of past discrimination were
undone, new judicial rankings would be necessary. The kind of
variable sociological and political analysis necessary to produce
such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial
competence-even if they otherwise were politically feasible and
45
socially desirable.
4
44 Bakke, supra note 12 at 295 n.3 .

45 Ibid. at 296-97. See also DeFunisv. Odegaard,416 U.S. 312, 338 - 339 (1974) [DeFunis]
(Douglas, J., dissenting):
The reservation of a proportion of the law school class for members of
selected minority groups is fraught with.., dangers, for one must
immediately determine which groups are to receive such favoured treatment
and which are to be excluded, the proportions of the class that are to be
allocated to each, and even the criteria by which to determine whether an
individual is a member of a favoured group. There is no assurance that a
common agreement can be reached, and first the schools, and then the
courts, will be buffeted with the competing claims. The University of
Washington included Filipinos, but excluded Chinese and Japanese;
another school may limit its program to blacks, or to blacks and Chicanos.
Once the Court sanctioned racial preferences such as these, it could not
then wash its hands of the matter, leaving it entirely in the discretion of the
school, for then we would have effectively overruled Sweatt v. Painter,339
U.S. 629 (1950), and allowed imposition of a 'zero' allocation. But what
standard is the Court to apply when a rejected applicant of Japanese
ancestry brings suit to require the University of Washington to extend the
same privileges to his group? The Committee might conclude that the
population of Washington is now 2% Japanese, and that Japanese also
constitute 2% of the Bar, but that had they not been handicapped by a
history of discrimination, Japanese would now constitute 5% of the Bar, or
20%. Or, alternatively, the Court could attempt to assess how grievously
each group has suffered from discrimination, and allocate proportions
accordingly-, if that were the standard the current University of Washington
policy would almost surely fall, for there is no Western State which can
claim that it has always treated Japanese and Chinese in a fair and evenhanded manner.
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Even Justice John Paul Stevens, who has recently voted to support a variety
of ameliorative plans, dissented from a "minority set-aside" to federal
construction funds, arguing that "our history will adequately support a
legislative preference for almost any ethnic, religious, or racial group with the
46
political strength to negotiate 'a piece of the action' for its members."
This is an area where American jurisprudence is in play, and the Canadian
example may provide assistance. In the area of gender classifications, a majority
of the United States Supreme Court agrees that
"Inherent differences" between men and women, we have come to
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of
the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an
individual's opportunity. Sex classifications may be used to
compensate women "for particular economic disabilities [they
have] suffered," to "promote equal employment opportunity," to
advance full development of the talent and capacities of our
Nation's people. But such classifications may not be used, as they
once were, to perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority
47
of women.
Canadian judges have proved adept at managing the Law standard of
substantive discrimination, which focuses on factors such as pre-existing
disadvantage and stereotype, the relationship between the classification and the
actual needs of affected persons, and the ameliorative purpose or effects of the

46 Fullilove, supranote 12 at 539. My friend Robin Elliot observes that the risk that the legislature
will use the pretext of affirmative action to favour various racial or ethnic groups may be greater
in the United States than in Canada because of the structural differences in our legislative
processes. In the United States, the President and legislative leaders may often need to resort
to bargaining and favours to obtain the votes necessary to secure passage of legislation. Indeed,
Justice Stevens suggested in Fullilove that the challenged "set-aside" of 10% of government
contracts for minority contractors may have been more due to the political demands of the
Congressional Black Caucus than a serious attempt to ameliorate particular forms of
discrimination. Ibid at 541-42. In Canada, a government that legislates with party discipline
has less need to bargain to obtain votes to secure passage of legislation. However, this
distinction can be overstated. Liberal governments in Ottawa are notorious for protecting
ethnic and other constituencies among their supporters with patronage. Moreover, nonlegislative pressure can also result in favoured treatment, which could represent legitimate
ameliorative policy or simply raw politics. For example, the affirmative action hiring plan
upheld in Athabasca, supra note 33, was approved to remove objections by native groups to a
proposal, requiring approval of a provincial regulatory board, that would permit energy
companies to engage in extensive exploration activities. (For a quick summary of these
legislative differences, see S. F Ross, "Comparative Canadian/U.S. Law" (fall 2002 ed.), at I-I
to 1-8. These materials are available on the internet by going to my website:
http://www.law.uiuc.edu/faculry/DirectoryResult.asp?Name=Ross,+Srephen, and going to the
appropriate link.
47 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996).
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classification. 48 For example, in Lavoie v. Canada,49 the Court sustained a
federal statute granting a citizenship preference for certain "open competition"
positions in the federal civil service as a reasonable limitation (under section 1)
only after concluding that the statute's discrimination against non-citizens was
a violation of section 15(1). The plurality thoughtfully explained the critical
issue: how non-citizens, subject to political marginalization, stereotyping, and
historical disadvantage, felt:
legitimately burdened by the idea that, having made their home in
Canada, ... their professional development was stifled on the basis
of their citizenship status. Their subjective reaction to the
citizenship preference no doubt differed from their reaction to not
being able to vote, sit in the Senate, serve on a jury, or remain in
Canada unconditionally. An obvious difference in this context is
that employment is vital to one's livelihood and selfworth; another
is that there is no apparent link between one's citizenship and one's
ability to perform a particular job; finally, the distinction can
reasonably be associated with stereotypical assumptions about

48 In addition to the cases discussed in text, see Granovsky v. Canada(MinisterofEmployment and
Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, 186 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (applying Law to reject claim of
discrimination by disabled pension applicant who had not met contribution qualifications for
Canada Pension Plan benefits he was seeking); Montreal (Ville) v. Quebec (Commission des
Droits de la Personne et des Droits de laJeunesse), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665, 686 at para. 36, 185
D.LR. (4th) 385 (liberally interpreting section 15's bar on discrimination on the basis of
handicap-in a manner broader than provided under U.S. statutes-to include applicant denied
employment because of physical impairment even though applicant was not deprived of
general life functions, because purpose of anti-discrimination legislation is to "eliminate
exclusion that is arbitrary and based on preconceived ideas concerning personal characteristics";
Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, 176 D.L.R. (4th) 513 (not
stereotypic substantive discrimination to exclude RCMP officers from collective bargaining
scheme of Public Service Staff Relations Act); Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric
Institute), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625, 678, 175 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (differential treatment of those
found not criminally responsible due to mental illness, involving individualized analysis of
their particular dangerousness, is "antithesis" of discrimination based on stereotype); M. v. H.,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (majority and dissent both focus on whether
statutory provision for "spousal support" for common law heterosexual couples but not samesex couples is the result of stereotype or rather lack of economic disadvantage in same-sex
couples). Although the concept of substantive discrimination from Andrews, supra note 27,
seems widely accepted, Canadians disagree as to whether Law. consideration of human dignity
as an element of the Section 15 analysis is proper, or whether instead these sorts of
considerations are best analyzed in determining whether a discriminatory act constitutes a
reasonable limit under section 1. Compare Hogg, supra note 29 at 52-25 (2001 leaflet ed.)
("element of human dignity ... is, in my view, vague, confusing and burdensome to equality
claimants") with D. Greschner, "Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?" (2001) 27 Queen's
L.J. 299, 309 ("labeling every distinction on enumerated or analogous grounds as a violation
of equality ... is inconsistent with substantive equality itself"). See text accompanying notes
61-62, infra.

49 2002 SCC 23, 210 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Lavoiecited to SCC].
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loyalty and commitment to the country, even if that is not
50
Parliament's intention.
In contrast, Justices Arbour and LeBel concluded that section 15(1) was not
violated under the Law standard. Justice Arbour distinguished an
unconstitutional provincial bar on non-citizens' admission to the bar from the
challenged statute. She characterized the latter as establishing "a package of
incentives-rights and privileges of citizenship-that will provide sufficient
motivation for non-citizens to naturalize and in the process take on these more
burdensome incidents, or duties, of citizenship." 5 ' Such a package "militates
strongly against finding that [the citizenship preference] is discriminatory in the
sense that it violates human dignity." 52 Although the justices disagreed, the
focus of the dispute illustrates how substantive equality can be judicially
manageable.
In Lovelace,53 the unanimous Court found that an agreement between the
Province of Ontario and representatives from the province's First Nations
concerning casino development did not substantively discriminate against nonparticipating Aboriginal communities that were not registered as bands under
the Indian Act.54 Despite "a recognition that, regrettably, the appellant and
respondent Aboriginal communities have overlapping and largely shared
histories of discrimination, poverty, and systemic disadvantage that cry out for
improvement," 55 the specific action challenged-a partnership between the
government of the province and the government of organized bands to create
funds to facilitate effective Aboriginal self-government-did not function "by
device of stereotype." Rather, it was tailored to accomplish the specific purposes
of a government-to-government venture that was simply not possible with
56
Aboriginal communities that were not formally organised under federal law.
In light of the ameliorative purpose of the law, the exclusion of other differently
situated (even if similarly disadvantaged) groups are less likely to convey "the
message that the excluded group is less worthy of recognition and participation
in the larger society." 57 The Court drew a sharp contrast between the statute
upheld in Lovelace and the one struck down in Corbierev. Canada (Ministerof
IndianandNorthern Affairs).5 8 In that case, the Court invalidated under section
15(1) a provision of the Indian Act that required Indians to be "ordinarily
resident" on a band's reserve in order to vote in band elections. The Court had
reasoned in Corbierethat

50 Ibid. at para. 52. McLachlin, C.J.C., and £Hereux-Dub6 and Binnie, JJ., agreed with this
portion of the plurality opinion but dissented from the plurality's conclusion that the violation
of s.15(l) was a reasonable limit.
51 Ibid.at para 115.
52 Ibid.at para 117.
53 Supra note 28.
54 R.S.C., 1985, C. 1-5.
55

Lovelace, supra note 28 at 961.

56 Ibid.at 993.
57 Ibid. at 954.
58 [19991 2 S.C.R. 203, 173 D.L.R. (4th) I[Corbierecitedto S.C.R.].
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The impugned distinction perpetuates the historic disadvantage
experienced by offreserve band members by denying them the right
to vote and participate in their band's governance. Offreserve band
members have important interests in band governance which the
distinction denies. They are coowners of the band's assets. The
reserve, whether they live on or off it, is their and their children's
land. The band council represents them as band members to the
community at large, in negotiations with the government, and
within Aboriginal organizations. Although there are some matters
of purely local interest, which do not as directly affect the interests
of offreserve band members, the complete denial to offreserve
members of the right to vote and participate in band governance
treats them as less worthy and entitled, not on the merits of their
59
situation, but simply because they live offreserve.
Indeed, Law itself exemplifies how a substantive discrimination standard
can be applied in a manageable way to lead to a conclusion of no
discrimination. The plaintiff challenged her denial of survivor's benefits under
the Canada Pension Plan until she reached age forty-five. The Court rejected
her constitutional challenge, reasoning:
The answers to the questions which I posed above with respect to
human dignity thus lie, in part, in the aim and effects of the
legislation in providing longterm financial security for Canadians
who lose a spouse, coupled with the greater flexibility and
opportunity of younger people without dependent children or
disabilities to achieve longterm security absent their spouse. Yes, the
law imposes a disadvantage on younger spouses in this class. But it
is unlikely to be a substantive disadvantage, viewed in the long
term. The law on its face treats such younger people differently, but
the differential treatment does not reflect or promote the notion
that they are less capable or less deserving of concern, respect, and
consideration, when the dual perspectives of longterm security and
the greater opportunity of youth are considered. Nor does the
differential treatment perpetuate the view that people in this class
are less capable or less worthy of recognition or value as human
beings or as members of Canadian society. Given the contemporary
and historical context of the differential treatment and those
affected by it, the legislation does not stereotype, exclude, or
devalue adults under 45. The law functions not by the device of
stereotype, but by distinctions corresponding to the actual situation
of individuals it affects. By being young, the appellant, a fortiori,
60
has greater prospect of longterm income replacement.

59 Ibid. at para. 17.
60 Law, supra note 36 at para. 102.
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To be sure, the rhetoric of "human dignity" that is the focus of recent
Canadian equality jurisprudence would seem to be subject to the very concerns
61
raised in Bakke and other American cases about judicial administrability.
Although the court has used this broad language to explain the "central
purpose" of section 15,62 the Court's holdings make it clear that the doctrinal
test remains focused on stereotype and disadvantage. That is to say, there are no
cases where the Court has found stereotype and disadvantage where it did not
find harm to human dignity, and no cases where the court found a harm to
human dignity that did not involve stereotype and disadvantage. The Canadian
cases thus reflect a body of law that builds upon a foundation similar to that
articulated by the dissenters in Bakke and, more recently, in the area of gender
63
classifications, by the majority in United States v. Virginia. It deserves
consideration and possible emulation south of the border.
IV. IS CANADA TOO DIFFERENT TO BE RELEVANT TO AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE?
An analysis of the differences in legal doctrine between two countries with
so much in common, like the United States and Canada, will generally reveal
three major explanations for the differences:
A. differences in the origins of our political and legal
institutions help expose the historical roots underpinning
our respective constitutional doctrines;
B. in some important respects, American and Canadian

societies reflect differing dominant cultural values that lead
to political ideologies underlying constitutional judgments
by our respective supreme courts;

61 Indeed, it is controversial among Canadian scholars as well. See supra note 49.
62 Supra note 28 at 984.
63 Supra note 48. It might facially appear that the Canadian approach and the minority view in
the United States are not the same, in that even the dissent in Bakke called for close judicial
scrutiny of ameliorative racial classifications to assure that they furthered an important
governmental interest and neither stigmatized nor unduly burdened a particular politically
marginalized group. Bakke, supra note 11 at 361-62. One might view the Canadian approach
as eliminating a similarly close review for ameliorative programs north of the border. This view
was explicitly rejected in Re Mac Vicar and Superintendent of Family and Child Services (1986),
34 D.L.R. (4th) 488, 503, 29 C.R.R. 37 (B.C.S.C.) [MacVicar], where the court noted that
under such a view "little discriminatory legislation could ever be attacked successfully, for
almost all positive law has as its stated object the betterment or amelioration of the conditions
in our community of a disadvantaged individual or group." (This view was endorsed by
McLachlin and Gonthier, JJ., in k v. Hess andNguyen, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906, 945, 59 C.C.C.
(3d) 161.) The approach undertaken in Lovelace seems very much in accord with Mac Vcar
and the Bakke dissent. Having found that the tripartite agreement between the provincial
government, First Nations bands and private casino operators constituted a genuine
ameliorative program, the Court did not end its inquiry but rather carefully considered
whether the exclusion of Aboriginal groups not part of First Nations bands organized under
the Indian Act constituted substantive discrimination, either by classifying based on stereotype
or unfairly burdening them.
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C. Canada's CharterofRights and other significant parts of the
Canadian Constitution were enacted in 1982, and in some
cases reflect the benefit of, or reaction to, settled experience
in the United States and elsewhere with difficult
64
constitutional issues.
In the context of equality, this sort of analysis reveals several plausible
explanations about why the Canadian Nine have taken a different path from
the American Five. A variety of different cultural values exist: Americans have a
history of slavery and apartheid and American values emphasize individualism
and the "melting pot," while Canadians lack such a history and possess a
relative enthusiasm for governmental acts to protect the collective rights of
disadvantaged groups. There is a lot to this theory, and it might be entirely
persuasive if the United States' "colour-blind jurisprudence" was endorsed by
American justices with the same unanimity as Canada's approach is by
Canadian justices. However, the deep division within the United States
Supreme Court, mirroring deep divisions within American society,
demonstrates that a large percentage of Americans operating within the context
of American history and values reach similar conclusions to those of Canadian
judges. Several factors may explain this deep division. Contrary to the claims of
the American majority, there is strong evidence that the original intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment, like the original intent of section 15, was to assure
substantive rather than formal equality. The lessons learned from prior judicial
errors may not be the need for a colour-blind jurisprudence, but rather a need
for judicial deference to legislative choices absent a showing of discrimination
against marginalised groups. Perhaps the question whether colour-blindness is
inconsistent with American values of individualism and meritocracy should be
irrelevant to judges once politically-responsive American officials have decided
that any inconsistency is appropriate.
A. The history/cultural values hypothesis
A strong argument counselling against the consideration of Canadian
equality jurisprudence by American courts is that significant differences in
historical experience combine with marked differences in contemporary
cultural values to explain the American emphasis on formal equality and the
Canadian focus on substantive equality. Decisions by the United States
Supreme Court suggest several possible historic/cultural differences that explain
why section 15 of the Charterhasbeen interpreted to be more tolerant than the
Fourteenth Amendment of acts that are formally but not substantively
65
discriminatory.
One argument is purely temporal. Section 15 was adopted in 1982, so that
Canadian framers were fully cognizant of the issue of affirmative action and

64 Ross, supra note 47 at i.
65 Preliminarily, two arguments raised by American justices to justify strict judicial scrutiny of
ameliorative classifications can be eliminated as raising no arguably distinctive American issues.
Justice O'Connor has argued that courts must closely examine a challenged governmental act
to determine if the classification really is benign and remedial, or rather if it instead the
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provided an answer consistent with contemporary Canadian political views.
Moreover, the Charter was enacted with strong support from feminists chafing
under the dashed hopes of the Bill of Rights, which had been interpreted to
promote strictly formal equality.(6 Justice Powell explained in Bakke, however,
that the body of American constitutional doctrine built up over time no longer
permitted a narrowing construction that would not apply the equality principle
to racial classifications designed to ameliorate prior racial disadvantage:
Petitioner urges us to adopt for the first time a more restrictive view
of the Equal Protection Clause and hold that discrimination against
members of the white "majority" cannot be suspect if its purpose
can be characterized as "benign." The clock of our liberties,
however, cannot be turned back to 1868. It is far too late to argue
that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the
recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection
greater than that accorded others. "The Fourteenth Amendment is
not directed solely against discrimination due to a 'two class
theory'- that is, based upon differences between 'white' and
Negro."67

Another argument could be made that Canadian and American students of
history learn diametrically opposite lessons about formal versus substantive
equality. Many Canadians look back critically on the Privy Council's highly
formalist decision in Barrett v. City of Winnipeg.68 That case concerned the
meaning of a prohibition against any law that "shall prejudicially affect any
government was motivated by "illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics." Croson, supra note 12 at 493. This really isn't a "difference," since it is clear that a
section 15 challenge to a Canadian governmental action would succeed, as would similar
American claims, if the plaintiff could demonstrate that under the pretext of amelioration the
Act was either compounding disadvantage based on "illegitimate notions of racial inferiority,"
on that the chosen means lacked a reasonable connection to the ameliorative goals. See
Lovelace supra note 28 at 1006-07 (citing with approval approach in Silano v. The Queen in
Right of British Columbia (1987), 42 D.L.R. (4th) 407 (B.C.S.C.) and Roberts v. Ontario
(1994) 19 O.R. (3d) 387 (C.A.). In another vein, in Bakke, supra note 12 at 292, Justice Powell
supported his conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause required strict judicial scrutiny of
racial classifications that harmed white plaintiff; as well as those that injured racial minorities
by arguing that "the United States had become a nation of minorities" who were all struggling
.to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of a 'majority' composed of
various minority groups of whom itwas said-perhaps unfairly in many cases-that a shared
characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other groups." Many of these groups (Powell
cited a government conclusion that this included Jews, Catholics, Italians, Greeks, and Slavs)
continue to be excluded from various jobs because of discrimination: Ibid. at 293 (citing 41
C.F.R. 60.50.1(b) (1977). In this regard, however, there does not appear to a significant
difference north of the border-nor does this explain why the appropriate standard is formal
equality rather than an inquiry that assures that the challenged classifications neither
stigmatizes nor unfairly burdens the claimant.
66 Canadian Bill ofRights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III; D. Greschner,
"Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?" (2001) 27 Queen's L.J. 299, 302 n.8.
67 Bakke supra note 12 at 294-95 (last sentence quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478
(1954)).
68 [18921 A.C. 445 (PC)[Barrrst].
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right or privilege with respect to denominational schools" contained in the
Manitoba Act, 1870, the province's founding legislation. The prohibition was
clearly designed to protect the pre-confederation practice whereby FrancoManitobans (almost all of whom were Catholic) were educated in French in
Catholic schools, while Anglo-Manitobans (almost all of whom were
Protestant) were educated in English in Protestant schools. Although the
population of Manitoba in the early days was almost evenly split, by the 1890s
it had tipped decidedly in favour of Anglophones, who secured a provincial
statute creating tax supported English-language public schools. Using principles
of formal equality, the Privy Council found these schools to be open to all, and
the fact that these schools were to be conducted in a non-native language,
without the benefit of the religious instruction demanded by the Catholic
Church, was not discrimination or prejudice: As the Privy Council explained,
"It is not the law that it is in fault" but rather due to their own convictions that
Catholics "find themselves unable to partake of advantages which the law offers
to all alike." 69 This decision played a significant role in the demise of a strong
Francophone community in Manitoba and the consequent reduction of the
French presence in Canada to Quebec and adjoining areas of New Brunswick
70
and Ontario.
Formal equality was similarly enforced in Ottawa SeparateSchool Trustees v.
Mackell 7 1 concerning the equivalent provision of the British North America
Act72 (also adopted when religious and linguistic lines were almost completely
identical). Franco-Ontarians sought to use the provision to challenge a
provincial policy requiring all Catholic school instruction to be in English
(imposed in part due to the increased immigration of Irish and other
Anglophone Catholics). This argument was likewise rejected. The rise of
Quebec nationalism has been attributed in part to the failure of the courts to
protect Francophones outside of Quebec. 73 The legacy of these exercises in
formal equality led to more recent enactments, including the Official Languages
Act, section 23 of the Charter,and Section 530 of the Criminal Code, all of
which are to be construed "purposively, in a manner consistent with the

69 Ibid. at 458.
70 Robert J. and Doreen Jackson explain the significance of the Barrettcase in Politics in Canada
4th ed. (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 997) [Jackson and Jackson] at 226-27. In
rejecting the Franco-Manitobans' legal claims, the Privy Council emphasized the special power
vested in the Canadian Parliament under section 93 of the BNA Act to disallow provincial
legislation of this sort. (Indeed, Section 90 of the original BNA Act conferred upon the federal
government a general power to disallow provincial legislation, but that power has now fallen
into disuse. See Hogg, supra note 29 at § 5.3(e).) The political effect was to divide the
Quebecois, who with a majority in their own province strongly opposed any notion of the
federal veto, from their fellow Francophones in the rest of Canada: in this case FrancoManitobans and the Catholic Church supported the predominantly Anglophone government
of Charles Tupper, who pledged to use disallowance; he lost the 1896 election to the Liberals,
led by Canada's first Francophone prime minister, Wilfred Laurier, who refused to use the
federal disallowance power.
71 [1917] A.C. 62 (PC.).
72 Charter,supra note 2, Section 93.
73 A summary of the suppression of French-language education outside of Quebec is reprinted in
Jackson andJackson, supra note 71, at 227.
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74
preservation and development of official language communities in Canada."
If Canadians view history as teaching that formal equality can result in
substantive inequality, 75 Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the American history
of separate but equal "contains one clear lesson: Under our Constitution, the
government may never act to the detriment of a person solely because of that
person's race." 76 Justice O'Connor noted that through the 1940s, the Supreme
Court had found that there was "no guarantee against discriminatory legislation
by Congress." 77 Although she cited no cases where the Supreme Court upheld
federal legislation that would have violated the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court's lax scrutiny led, in her view, to "unfortunate results" in cases sustaining
the internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War 11.78 Justice
Scalia, quoting a noted constitutional scholar, wrote, "I share the view expressed
by Alexander Bickel that '[t]he lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme
Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at least a
generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral,
79
unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society.'

Another significant historic and cultural difference between American and
Canadian society concerns the relative importance given to individual rights
south of the border. Justice O'Connor emphasized in Croson that the
Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on the deprivation of equal protection to
"any person" guarantees personal rights to individuals, not to groups. 80
Characterizing affirmative action as creating "a creditor or a debtor race,Justice Scalia found such an approach to be "alien to the Constitution's focus
8
on the individual." '
In contrast, group rights have always played a major role in Canada. The
Constitution Act, 1867 entrenches public support for pre-confederation
denominational schools. 82 The Chartergoes even further, specifically granting
(section 23) education rights to members of linguistic minority groups and
affirming (section 27) the multicultural heritage of Canadians.
Guaranteeing that Francophones in Alberta or Anglophones in Quebec can
send their children to separate public schools, or recognizing that membership

74 Official Languages Act, R.S.C., c. 31 (4th supp.); R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [ Criminal Cod];
Beaulac v. The Queen, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, at 791-92, 173 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Bastarache,
J.)[Beaulaccited to S.C.R.].
75 Cf Andrews, supra note 27, at 164 (McIntyre, J.) (recognizing that "identical treatment may
frequently produce serious inequality").
76 Fullilove, supra note 12, at 525.
77 Adarand supra note 40, at 213. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
only applies by its terms to states. It was not until Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a
companion case to Brown concerning segregation in District of Columbia schools, that the
Court construed the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on congressional denials of due process to
contain an equal protection component.
78 Adarand, Ibid. at 213, citing Hirabayashiv. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) and Korematsu
v. UnitedStates, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
79 Croson, supra note 12 at 521 (quoting Alexander Bickel, The Morality of Consent 133 (1975)).
80 Ibid. at 493, citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). Seealso Adarand,supra note 40
at 226 (the Constitution protects "persons, not groups").
81 Adarand, supra note 40 at 239.
82 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, Section 93, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
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in a First Nation may permit an individual to exercise Aboriginal rights (for
fishing, hunting, or maintenance of a home) that other Canadians do not
possess, 83 are clear signs that Canadians intend that their race and origin remain
highly relevant in the future. In contrast, rejecting the dissenting justices' view
that ameliorative racial classifications should be reviewed more deferentially, the
American majority complained that such a "watered-down version of Equal
Protection review effectively assures that race will always be relevant in
American life." 84 Even Justice Blackmun, who supported the constitutionality
of race-conscious ameliorative programs, earnestly hoped that they would only
be temporary so that "persons will be regarded as persons, and discrimination
of the type we address today will be an ugly feature of history."85 This is
consistent with the traditional Canadian self-image that their society is a
"mosaic," one that gives diverse ethnic groups the right to cultural survival,
86
while Americans emphasize assimilation into a "melting pot."
Another potential difference lies in the American ideal of a meritocracy.
Condemning race-conscious law school admissions, Justice Douglas observed,
in a dissenting opinion, that a white applicant "had a constitutional right to
have his application considered on its individual merits in a racially neutral
manner." 87 As Justice Scalia has more recently stated: "When we depart from
this American principle we play with fire." 88 In contrast, class distinctions have
a much richer tradition in Canada. Studies suggest that Canadians are "much
more tolerant of ruling elites and oligarchs than Americans." 89 In the later part
of last century, for example, over sixty percent of top Canadian executives were
born into the upper-class, in contrast to less than a third of their American
90
counterparts.
A variety of Canadian traditions exemplify the greater concern with balance
and inclusion than with idealized versions of merit. One of the keys to Prime
Minister Jean Chretien's ascendancy to the leadership of the Liberal Party was
the tradition that the head job should alternate between Anglophones and
Francophones. Appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada has distinctive
constraints (albeit not always strictly adhered to) concerning the province from
whence a nominee should come and, for the central provinces, further sub-

83 See, e.g., R v. Sparrow, (1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (Section 35 of the Charter
recognizes the Musquem Indians' right to fish for salmon in the Fraser River notwithstanding
contrary provision in federal regulatory legislation).
84 Croson, supra note 12 at 495.
85 Bakke, supra note 12 at 403 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86 S.M. Lipset, ContinentalDivide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada
(New York: Routledge, 1990) at 172.
87 DeFunis,supra note 46.
88 Croson, supra note 12 at 527. (emphasis added)
89 M. Goldberg & J. Mercer, The Myth of the North American City: Continentalism Challenged
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1986) at 247.
90 Upset, supra note 87 at 163.
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groupings. 91 Although there are a few American conventions, 92 the rhetoric of
merit or qualifications is much stronger south of the border.
In sum, official Supreme Court decisions reveal a variety of explanationsbased on history, culture, and values-for the establishment of a doctrine of
substantive equality open to ameliorative programs in Canada, while in the
United States the doctrine is one of formal equality and hostility to raceconscious ameliorative programs. 93 Defenders of formal equality could build on
these explanations to conclude, in today's vernacular, that the United States'
longer history has resulted in a "path dependence" that requires formal equality
while the Canadian Charterspecifically legalizes ameliorative programs. 94 The
lessons of Canadian legal history suggest the courts err when embarking on
formal equality; the lessons of American tolerance of "separate but equal" and
judicial approval of the wholesale incarceration of loyal citizens of Japanese
descent during World War II demonstrate that courts are not to be trusted with
anything other than strict formal equality. Ameliorative action is much more
consistent with group rights, which Canada endorses in a variety of
constitutional provisions and culturally through the concept of the "Canadian
mosaic," while the inevitable claim that individuals excluded from a raceconscious program have been injured is more consistent with the American
emphasis on individual rights and the American goal of the "melting pot."
B. Rejecting the history/cultural values hypothesis
As a purely descriptive matter, the foregoing catalogue could lead reasonable
people to conclude that the doctrinal differences between the Supreme Court
By statute, three of the justices must be members of the Quebec bar. By tradition, three others
come from Ontario, and one each from the maritime provinces, the prairies, and British
Columbia. As to the smaller provinces, usually a nominee will succeed a justice from another
province. Traditionally, one Quebec judge has been an Anglophone. One Ontario judge has
often come directly from the bar, while another has traditionally come from the Ontario Court
of Appeal.
92 From 1930 until today, one seat has generally been occupied by a Jewish justice (Cardozo, J.
was succeeded by Frankfurter, J., Goldberg, J., & Fortas, J. After Blackmun, J.'s retirement,
Stephen Breyer was named to the seat.)
93 An unstated and somewhat cynical political difference may also explain the relative Canadian
embrace of substantive equality. Because controversies about legal treatment of aboriginals
tends to deal more with section 35 of the ConstitutionAct, 1980 (protecting Aboriginal
rights), and because of the relative lack of racial tension in Canada, when Canadians think of
those likely to benefit from a doctrine of substantive equality, they are more likely to think of
themselves or people close to them (women, the disabled, gay and lesbian friends). When
Americans think of substantive equality, they are more likely to think of the concept in racial
terms and whites may simply be more reluctant to insist that the government grant
substantive equality to African Americans or other racial minorities.
94 Path dependence is a concept borrowed from economics and antitrust law, which suggests that
"even small historical events, particularly those that occur early in the formation of an industry,
can have unexpectedly long-lasting effects on market outcomes." D. Roithmayr, "Barriers to
Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination" (2000) 86 Va. L. Rev. 727, 742. The
QWERTY keyboard, the standard arrangement for typewriter (and now computer) keyboards,
provides an oft-cited example of path dependence. An event need not be of major significance
to have long-lasting effects on outcomes. Ibid. at 787. As applied here, the concept would
suggest that events in American history have led the courts to adopt a jurisprudence of formal
equality that would not have been required absent those events.
91
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of Canada and the five-justice majority on the United States Supreme Court is
primarily explained due to the important differences that still exist between
Canada and the United States. If the colour-blind approach taken by the
American majority was simply more consistent with American history and
values than the more substantive approach adopted by both the Supreme Court
of Canada and dissenting American justices, then Charter practice would
indeed have little to add to the American debate. There are serious grounds to
question, however, the claim that a doctrine of formal rather than substantive
equality necessarily follows from American history and values.
Although Justice Powell is obviously correct in observing that the Equal
Protection Clause is not limited to discrimination against African-Americans,
his comment in Bakke that it was "far too late to argue that the guarantee of
equal protection to all person permits the recognition of special wards entitled
to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others" 95 would appear to
rate a "False" if offered by an American student of constitutional law on a final
exam, in light of the "three-tier" approach to equal protection established by the
United States Supreme Court since the landmark case of CaroleneProducts.96 In
that case, the Court refused to seriously consider a claim that a federal statute
unconstitutionally deprived equal protection of the laws to sellers of a certain
kind of skim milk. In its famous footnote, the Court suggested that its highly
deferential approach would not necessarily apply when "prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry."97 Since then, it is clear that a variety of classes of plaintiffs,
including racial minorities, women, religious groups, aliens, children born to
unmarried parents, and others are indeed "special wards entitled to a degree of
protection greater than that accorded others" such as milk producers. 98 A
consistent application of Carolene Products would appear to support the claim
of the four justices in Bakkewho favoured deferential treatment for ameliorative
programs. 99 Thus, certainly by 1977 it was not "too late to argue" for an
equality jurisprudence that reserved careful judicial scrutiny to governmental
classifications that marginalize, ignore, or devalue people based on stereotype,
prejudice, or vulnerability.100

95
96
97
98

Bakke, supra note 12 at 294-95, quoted at supra note 67.
Supra note 5.
Carolene Products, ibid. at 153 n.4.
See generally, J. Nowak & R. Rotunda, ConstitutionalLaw, 6th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West

Publishing Co., 2001), at § 14.3.
99 Bakke, supra note 12 at 357 (Brennan, J., White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ. Dissenting). See
also Paul Brest, "Affirmative Action and the Constitution: Three Theories", 72 Iowa L. Rev.
281, 283 (1987) (Carolene Products jurisprudence leads to conclusions that reverse
discrimination will rarely state a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment). Justice
Powell distinguished Carolene Products,concluding that its teaching had "never been invoked
in our decisions as a prerequisite to subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions to strict scrutiny.
Nor has this Court held that discreteness and insularity constitute necessary preconditions to
a holding that a particular classification is invidious." Bakke, supra note 12 at 290.
100 Cf Lovelace, supra note 27 at 990-9 1.
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Nor can devotees of an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation
draw sharp distinctions between the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the framing of the Charter.The Court's initial view of the Amendment as
protecting an African-American "from the oppressions of those who had
formerly exercised dominion over him"' 0 ' was, as Justice Powell conceded in
Bakke, effectively "strangled in infancy by post-civil-war judicial
reactionism." 1 0 2 In his separate Bakke dissent, Justice Marshall provided
detailed historic support for his conclusion that it was "plain that the
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to prohibit measures designed to
03
remedy the effects of the Nation's past treatment of Negroes."'
Although Canadians may have learned some unique lessons about the
problems of formal equality from the interpretation of their founding
document, the British North America Act, by English judges who have been
criticized as the "wicked stepfathers of confederation,"' 10 4 the American lesson
is not necessarily, as Justice O'Connor argued, that racial classifications are
always bad. A very strong counter-argument-indeed the one propounded by
Carolene Products-is that the lesson of American legal history is that judges
should not interfere with the complex policy judgments of legislative officials
absent some evidence that the legislative process has serious flaws that will result
10 5
in discrimination against disadvantaged or politically marginalised groups.
To be sure, comparative sociological studies suggest that Americans place
greater value on individual rights and are more adamant in believing in
meritocracy than Canadians. But these insights do not explain why, when
American legislators believe that an exception to these values are justified,
American judges should displace this judgment with their own values.' 0 6 In a
similar vein, the differences between the "melting pot" and "mosaic" ideologies
might explain why ameliorative programmes are less likely to succeed on

101 Slaughterhouse Cases, supra note 20 at 71.
102 Bakke, supra note 12 at 291 (quoting J. Tussman & J. tenBroek, "The Equal Protection of the
Laws" (1949) 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 389).
103 Ibid.at 396-97. In particular, Marshall, J. recounts the enactment by the same Congress that
proposed the Fourteenth Amendment of the Act ofJuly 16, 1866 (the "Freedmen' Bureau Act'),
ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173, providing many benefits solely to former slaves. Responding to
objections that the bill "undertakes to make the negro in some respects ... superior ... and gives
them favors that the poor white boy in the North cannot get," Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 401 (remarks of Sen. McDougall), the bill's supporters argued: The very discrimination it
makes between 'destitute and suffering' negroes, and destitute and suffering white paupers,
proceeds upon the distinction that, in the omitted case, civil rights and immunities are already
sufficiently protected by the possession of political power, the absence of which in the case
provided for necessitates governmental protection. Ibid. at 75 (remarks of Rep. Phelps).
104 Hogg, supra note 29 at 5-17 (quoting constitutional scholar E. A. Forsey).
105 See, e.g., J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1980).
106 Note that a constitutional doctrine of substantive equality does not require affirmative action
programs but allows elected officials to enact them if they so choose. For example, the NDP
(social democratic) government in Ontario enacted the Employment Equity Act, 1993, S.O.
1993, c. 35, requiring employers to adopt a number of affirmative steps to improve hiring of
Aboriginals, people with disabilities, racial minorities, and women.
A Conservative
government subsequently enacted the Job Quotas Repeal Act, 1995. S.O. 1995, c. 4. The
constitutional authority to enact the latter was upheld in Ferrell v. Ontario (Attorney General),
42 O.R. (3d) 97, 168 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (C.A.).

250

Windsor Yearbook ofAccess to Justice

2002

Capitol Hill than Parliament Hill, but these differences don't explain why, when
faced with a judgment by elected officials somewhat inconsistent with the
nation's traditional ideology, American judges feel justified in intervening. This
is particularly troublesome when sociological evidence, at least, suggests that
10 7
Americans may be moving away from their assimilationist traditions.
Finally, scepticism toward a socio-historic determinist approach is
appropriate in light of the bare majority of the United States Supreme Court
that endorses the "American" view. Bakke was a highly divided opinion and
while Justice Powell's concurrence has significant precedential weight-both
because it was in the middle and because it is the most detailed and thoughtful
exposition of the formal equality position to date emanating from the Supreme
Court-it is still an opinion from a single justice. To be crude, it is no
exaggeration to suggest that if Chief Justice Rehnquist's ailing back had
becoming disabling during President Carter's administration, the United States
Supreme Court could well have a five-justice majority who viewed the Equal
Protection Clause in a manner very similar to that expressed by the Supreme
Court of Canada, even if nothing else in the prior discussion about differing
histories or values had changed.
If that had occurred, then the socio-historic determinists would be hard
pressed to explain why a majority would reject Justice Stewart's view that the
constitutional standard "cannot be any different when the persons injured by a
racially biased law are not members of a racial minority" because from "the
perspective of a person detrimentally affected by a racially discriminatory law,
the arbitrariness and unfairness is entirely the same, whatever his skin color and
whatever the law's purpose, be it purportedly 'for the promotion of the public
good' or otherwise."' 08 Instead, the majority view of justices who share the
same American history as Justice Stewart, would be that:
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy
that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to
eradicate racial subordination. Invidious discrimination is an
engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavoured group to enhance
or maintain the power of the majority. Remedial racebased
preferences reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality
in society. No sensible conception of the Government's
constitutional obligation to "govern impartially" should ignore this
distinction. 109

107 Lipset, supra note 87 at 187 observes that a 1989 survey showed that 61% of Canadians
thought that newcomers should change their culture "to blend with the larger society,"
compared to only 51% of Americans who felt the same way.
108 Fullilove, supra note 12 at 526.
109 Adarand, supranote 40 at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting), quoting Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976). The dissenting opinion continued: The consistency that the Court
espouses would disregard the difference between a "No Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat.
It would treat a Dixiecrat Senator's decision to vote against Thurgood Marshall's confirmation
in order to keep African Americans off the Supreme Court as on a par with President Johnson's
evaluation of his nominee's race as a positive factor. It would equate a law that made black
citizens ineligible for military service with a program aimed at recruiting black soldiers. An
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If history or nationalistic cultural values explained the doctrinal differences
in constitutional equality norms, then obviously the Canadian approach would
have little relevance south of the border. Since these differences do not
adequately explain why a bare majority of American justices would adopt one
approach while a minority of American justices and virtually all Canadian
justices would adopt another one, Canadian insights take on greater relevance
in shaping American thinking about ideologies and values we share with our
northern neighbours.

V. CAROLENE PRODUCTSVINDICATED
When the Charter was enacted, Canadians were anxious, but cautious,
about adopting an American-style regime of judicial review of legislative
judgments. A variety of provisions - including the critical provision in
section 1 that all rights are subject to reasonable limits that can be
demonstrably justified, and the power under section 33 to enact laws
notwithstanding their inconsistency with certain sections of the Charter demonstrates this caution. American constitutional jurisprudence was plagued
during the early part of the previous century with the so-called "Lochner era"
whereby judges invalidated social and economic legislation, under the guise of
the broad language of the Fourteenth Amendment, because of their own
philosophical disdain for the legislation, and eventually led the United States
Supreme Court to adopt in Carolene Productsa deferential view of legislative
determinations vis-a-vis the broad norms of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 10
Framers of the Canadian Charterwere anxious to avoid these problems.
One of the advantages of a constitutional doctrine of substantive equality
is that it gives legislatures more room to develop constructivesolutions to
complex problems of social inequality. Where solutions reflect stereotype,
perpetuate disadvantage, or unfairly burden a discrete and insular minority,
both Carolene Products and Canadian jurisprudence suggest that judges
should intervene; when solutions do not have these adverse characteristics,
judges should exercise restraint.
Indeed, an overview of all of Canadian constitutional law is useful as a
reminder to Americans of the merits of returning to a Carolene Products
jurisprudence limiting judicial activism to situations where the political process
is unlikely to protect rights. Canadian courts have long been active in policing
the bounds of federal and provincial power because the Canadian political
process provides no means for provincial interests to constrain, effectively, a
determination by a federal Prime Minister to encroach on their power, nor the
revese. 111 Active scrutiny, along lines roughly similar to American
attempt by the majority to exclude members of a minority race from a regulated market is
fundamentally different from a subsidy that enables a relatively small group of newcomers to
enter that market. An interest in "consistency' does not justify treating differences as though
they were similarities. Ibid. at 245. These sentiments would appear to be fully shared by
Justice McIntyre in Andrews or Justice lacobucci in Lovelace (see text accompanying notes 2730 supra).
110 See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 99, §11.4; Hogg, supra note 29, §44.7(b).
111 Compare P. Weiler, In the Last Resort: A CriticalStudy ofthe Supreme Courtof Canada(Toronto:
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jurisprudence, characterizes Canadian protection of individual rights. Here,
Canadians and Americans share similar concerns about the risk of majoritarian
oppression concerning expression, association, religion, and the rights of the
accused.l1 2 On the other hand, the fear of unwarranted judicial activism that
characterized the so-called "Lochner era" in American jurisprudence and the
Canadian experience without any constitutional protection for property or
economic interests led to the deliberate 3 exclusion of economic liberty or
property rights from Charterprotection."1
There is strong evidence in American legal history that the cause of social
14
equality has been furthered more by Congress than by the Supreme Court.
While not precisely analogous, the Canadian legal history of protection of the
French minority suggests that Canadian courts have done better when deferring
5
to legislative judgments and less well in protecting individual rights."l
In sum, the Canadian lessons reinforce American efforts to return to a
Carswell, 1974) (arguing that the Supreme Court of Canada necessarily acts in a manner
similar to an interest arbitrator to prevent overreaching) with J. Choper, JudicialReview and
the National Political Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) (arguing that
structure of American Congress and American party politics adequately protects states from
federal overreaching, thus obviating the need for active constitutional scrutiny of legislation on
federalism grounds).
112 See generally Hogg, supra note 29 Part III.
113 Jbid.§ 44.7(b). The theoretical arguments justifying the exclusion of a right to property from
the Charter see, e.g., J. Bakan, "Against Constitutional Property Rights," in D. Cameron &
M. Smith, eds., ConstitutionalPolitics (Toronto: Lorimer, 1992), were, in fairness, bolstered by
a realpolitik awareness by the Trudeau government that provincial approval of a Charter would
not be possible if such a right were included. Prince Edward Island was fiercely opposed to
such a right as a potential threat to their laws restricting non-resident land ownership and the
New Democratic Party (especially significant because it controlled the Manitoba government
at the time) rejected any potential restriction on the socialization of resources. See J. McBean,
"The Implications of Entrenching Property Rights in Section 7 of the Charter of Rights"
(1988) 26 Alta. L. Rev. 548. For American readers, it is useful to observe that the
jurisprudential point that property owners do not need counter-majoritarian constitutional
protection seems borne out by the Canadian experience. The federal government and the
provinces all have enacted legislation requiring compensation for expropriation and the courts
have adopted a non-constitutional principle of statutory interpretation requiring compensation
absent explicit legislative wording to the contrary: see, e.g., Manitoba Fisheries, Ltd. v. The
Queen, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101, 88 D.L.R. (3d) 462.
114 In his article, "The Rise and Fall of Supreme Court Concern for Racial Minorities," (1995) 36
Wim. & Mary L. Rev. 345, my colleague John Nowak traces the anti-original interpretation of
the Civil War Amendments utilized by the Supreme Court in the late 19th Century to strike
down legislation and how the Supreme Court in recent years has consistently interfered with
congressional efforts to ameliorate the effects of racial discrimination. Cf M. Mandel,
"Commentaries on Mark Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts: Article:
Against Constitutional Law (Populist or Otherwise)" (2000) 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 443, 445
(leftist scholars have traditionally asserted that active judicial review was likely to be reactionary,
a view that "got sidetracked for a short period after that because of the world-famous liberal
period of the U.S. Warren Court").
115 A complete analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this paper. However, early efforts to
protect the Francophone communities in Alberta and Ontario by preserving French-language
education were apparently sabotaged both by formalist interpretations of the British North
America Act and by a political judgment by Francophone politicians from Quebec that
French Canadians as a whole had more to lose from potential federal intervention in Quebec
than to gain from federal intervention to protect Francophones elsewhere. At the same time,
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CaroeneProductsjurisprudence cabining close judicial scrutiny for those sort of
classifications that raise a serious risk of majoritarian tyranny over a minority. A
jurisprudence of formal equality such as the contemporary American equality
jurisprudence raises all the fears that led to Carolene Products while a
jurisprudence that looks at differential treatment from the perspective of
substantive disadvantage and stereotype seems more consistent with the spirit
of footnote four.

VI. CONCLUSION
The twentieth anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
provides a wonderful opportunity for Canadians to celebrate. Obviously the
greatest impact of the Charter,over the past two decades and into the future,
will be in shaping a distinctly Canadian society. Important dividends of the
evolving Charter jurisprudence come from insights for those beyond the
Canadian border.
One prominent example is the interpretation of equality principles in

the development of a distinct French Canadian culture within Quebec can be attributed at
least in part to a federalism jurisprudence that allowed Quebec to govern itself relatively free
of meddlesome (and predominantly English) political directives from Ottawa. Similarly, the
courts upheld legislative initiatives to protect Francophones through the Official Languages
Act, supra note 75, and other bilingual initiatives. On the other hand, the Court's record
during the 1980s-when Quebec nationalism and antagonism with English Canada was quite
strong-was characterized primarily by the inconsistent use of various methods of
constitutional interpretation with the result that the French usually lost: see, e.g., A.G.
(Quebec) v. Blaikie, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 312, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 15 (giving a broad and purposeful
interpretation of Section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867to require Quebec administrative
regulations to be promulgated in English and French); Attorney General (Quebec) v.
Association of Quebec ProtestantSchool Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, 10 D.L.R. (4th) 321
(adopting a previously rejected originalist interpretive approach to refuse to consider
justifications for why a requirement that Anglophone Canadian children moving to Quebec
attend French-language schools was a reasonable limit, under section 1, on the linguistic
rights guaranteed to those children by section 23 of the Charter); Societe des Acadiens v. Ass'n
of Parents, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549, 27 D.L.R. (4th) 406 (adopting a narrow approach to section
19 of the Charter-aprovision mandating bilingualism in the Canadian and New Brunswick
governments-to hold that the provision was not violated when an appeal by Francophone
litigants was heard by a panel including a unilingual Anglophone judge); Fordv. Quebec
(Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 54 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (holding first that a section of
the Quebec CharterofHuman Rights and Freedoms permitting the legislature to fix limits on
the scope of rights was to be read identically to a differently worded section 1 of the federal
Charter,thus requiring that any limitation on rights must be shown to minimally impair the
rights, and then holding second that a law requiring all commercial signs to be in French
only (subject to administrative waiver) was unnecessary to accomplish the legitimate,
pressing, and substantial provincial interest in creating a visage linguistiquethat would
demonstrate to Francophones that they can flourish in their own language, Anglophones that
they should become bilingual, and immigrants that they should learn French rather than
English). By 1990, with a greater acceptance of bilingualism, the Supreme Court began to
reverse that approach and broadly protect Francophone minorities outside Quebec: see, e.g.,
Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, 68 D.L.R. (4th) 69 (broad interpretation of section
23 minority linguistic rights to require that Francophone Edmontonians control Frenchlanguage schools).
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section 15 of the Charter. Canadian jurisprudence reading this constitutional
provision as a prohibition on government actions that substantively
discriminate, usually by victimizing the disadvantaged through stereotype or
prejudice, contrasts sharply with the current American doctrine that, on
grounds of formal equality, invalidates race-conscious programmes designed to
remedy the legacy of racial injustice in the United States. The Canadian
experience is relevant to the American controversy in several respects. It is
significant that, in contrast with other areas of jurisprudence, Canadians do not
seriously believe that ameliorative programmes result in harm to disadvantaged
groups through stigmatizing them with a brand of inferiority, but, rather, are
effective in remedying social disadvantage. Even more significant is the
development of post-Bakke jurisprudence in a different direction in Canada,
which demonstrates that courts can develop a judicially manageable body of
precedent where the test is substantive rather than formal equality. Although
significant differences between Canadian and American history and culture
plausibly explain the different doctrines adopted by the majority of each
nation's highest court, these differences are not so significant that one can
conclude that formal equality is compelled by American history and culture to
a degree sufficient to render the Canadian experience irrelevant south of the
border. Indeed, while differences exist, the major lesson for Americans from
Canadian equality jurisprudence is that the latter is arguably more faithful to a
jurisprudence of careful judicial restraint set forth in the landmark American
decision in Carolene Products than the more recent interventionist body of
American case law, which is relative terms looks to be judicial activism. These
lessons are as useful in the "Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave" as well
as in the "True North Strong and Free."

